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Summary  
 
Serious incidents in the 1970s and continuous growth of factories producing and/or using 
hazardous substances formed the basis of a quantitative approach to risk. While discussions of risk 
were conducted in all industrialized countries they were particularly important in The Netherlands due 
to space limitations and short distances between industrial plants and residential areas. This article is 
part of a series covering the history of the safety science discipline (Swuste et al., 2015; Gulijk et al., 
2009; Swuste et al, 2010). 
The concept risk entered the Dutch safety domain before the 1970s in relatively isolated case 
studies and in managing The Netherland’s flood defences. Since the 1970s these cases paved the 
way for the development of  mathematical models for quantitative risk analysis that were based on 
experience from nuclear power plants, the process industries and reliability engineering from 
operations research. 'External safety’ was a focal point for these early developments: adverse effects 
of dangerous goods outside the factory’s property boundaries. The models were documented in 
standardized textbooks for risk analysis in The Netherlands, the so-called 'coloured books'. These 
works contributed to the development of the Seveso Directive. For internal safety (taking place within 
property boundaries) semi-quantitative approaches were developed alongside external quantitative 
models.  
The models for quantitative risk analysis were deemed reliable, but the acceptability of a 
quantified risk was another matter. Making decisions on risk relates to complex societal issues, such 
as ethics, stakeholder perception of risks, stakeholder involvement, and politics, all of which made the 
decision making process far from straightforward. Parallel with the introduction of the concept of risk 
in the Dutch safety science domain, the question of risk perception also became important in Dutch 
safety research. 
The concept risk and methods for quantitative risk analysis first entered into Dutch law in 
environmental risk regulations. It took a while before risk was accepted by occupational safety 
experts, but just before the turn of the century ‘occupational risk inventory and evaluation’ or RI&E 
methods were introduced into Dutch occupational safety legislation. This finalized the paradigm shift 
to risk-based safety-decision making in the Dutch safety science domain. While methods for 
quantifying risk are now widely applied and accepted, the proper use of risk perception and risk in the 
political decision process are still being debated.   
 
1. Introduction  
 
The public debate on whether to allow LNG super tankers into Rotterdam harbour in 1975 shed light 
on the context in which risk enters the safety domain in The Netherlands. The proposals for LNG 
landing led to spectacular visions of vapour cloud explosions with the power of a atomic bomb. These 
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exorbitant projections drove the need to ‘put some numbers’ and thus to get a better grip on the 
problem, thereby facilitating sensible safety decision making. The heated debate about LNG abated 
after the discovery of a huge natural gas field in the North of The Netherlands, but the debate about 
the introduction of the risk paradigm and the acceptability of risks had started. The LNG discussion 
took place in the background of the introduction of new industrial activities in The Netherlands that 
would  involve huge amounts of hazardous materials. In this context, the discussion about adverse 
consequences for local residents provided the motive for risk research in the seventies. The limited 
land space in The Netherlands forced consideration of safe separation distances between the 
(process) industry and residential areas. This development emphasizes the central role of the Dutch 
risk-based approach in the discussion about safe distances between urban centres and high hazard 
industries. As risk-based research progressed, the definition of risk as a combination of the probability 
and the effects of incidents became increasingly accepted. This definition had a structuring effect on 
the public debate on risks, and reduced the debate to realistic proportions (Pasman, 1999). From the 
seventies onward risk was frequently placed on the political agenda. The scientific debate on risk as a 
basis for safety decision making was not restricted to the field of safety science and is still on-going 
(Vlek and Stallen, 1979; Health Council of The Netherlands, 1996; Health Council of The Netherlands 
2008; WRR, 2008, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2012). Despite that, the full 
implementation of the risk paradigm for safety decision making can said be completed in the late 
1990’s.  
 
This article is part of a series on historical research into the professional field of safety science. The 
first article in this series described the first steps in this field in the early twentieth century. The theory 
of accident-prone workers was developed in this period and was supported by the first statistics data 
on occupational accidents (Swuste et al, 2010). A second article deals with the development of safety 
engineering in the interwar period, with emphasis on the contribution of the American Heinrich (Gulijk 
et al, 2009). The third article covers the period after the Second World War until the early seventies. 
Then the focus remains strongly on occupational safety and broadens the analysis of accidents in the 
direction of task analysis and epidemiological approach (Swuste et al, 2014a). Two  recent articles 
describe the period of emergence of safety management systems until the nuclear incident at Three 
Mile Island in 1979 (Swuste et al, 2014b), and from Three Mile Island till Piper Alpha (Swuste et al., 
2015), both dealing with the development of occupational and process safety.  
This article covers the period 1970-1990, during which the concept and definition of risk was 
introduced into the safety science domain. From 1970 onwards there are articles in Dutch journals 
discussing the assessment of risks. Gradually the attention shifts from damage and effect to damage 
related to probability: from damage control to risk control. Together with the concept of risk and risk 
perception, terms such as damage, effect and hazard were explored and defined. 
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In the period after 1990, the public debate about the concept of risk broadened. Therefore, 
1970-1990 is an appropriate time period for this article, notwithstanding that occasionally the text 
reports developments that have taken place outside this period.  
 
This article addresses the following research questions: 
1. What developments were decisive for introducing the concept of risk in safety science in The 
Netherlands?  
2. Which theories, models, and metaphors were developed in the considered period (1970-1990)?  
3. What differences exist between the introduction of the concept of risk into occupational safety and 
into process safety?  
 
More than previous articles in this series, this article focuses on specifically Dutch developments 
around the concept of risk in safety studies. In The Netherland the probabilistic approach was first 
introduced in flood risk, but with the introduction  in chemical process safety, the concept and the 
analytical methods developed further and were much more widely used,. Only later was the term risk 
also used in the Dutch occupational safety domain. Whereas occupational safety focuses on the 
entire range of incidents in the workplace, process safety tends more to focus on incidents with a 
small probability of occurrence but with major effects, effects both inside and outside the plant 
premises, the latter including public and environment.  
 
2. Materials and methods 
 
This article is based on analysing original safety science and professional literature of the period 
examined. We studied publications that introduced the concept of risk, and we focus on the 
arguments for introducing risk as a concept and the methodology development into safety science.  
The analysis for this article started with articles introducing the concept of risk in the Dutch 
journal De Veiligheid (The Safety) and their references in Tijdschrift voor Sociale Gezondheidszorg 
(Journal of Social Medicine) and De Ingenieur (The Engineer). Furthermore the original reports of 
specific studies in this period (1970-1990) have been explored: LPG study (TNO,1983), the COVO 
study the industrialized Rijnmond area (Cremer and Warner, 1982) and the related Canvey Island 
report (Cremer and Warner, 1980) and the Dutch textbook series on quantitative risk analyses 
(‘coloured books’) studies. The references were mainly from UK, US or The Netherlands. In addition 
to the references in these studies we searched journals on the use of terms related to risk. Journal of 
Hazardous Materials, Reliability Engineering & System Safety and Journal of Risk Analysis were the 
main sources. 
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In addition for the period up to 1970 we used sources from the previous four articles of this 
historical series. Additionally, we studied the report from the CPR (Commission for Prevention of 
Disasters) and  consulted the reports on risk from the Health Council of The Netherlands. 
This article focuses on legislation, general policy the public debate and the scientific 
discussion on the concept of risk. 
 
3. The period up to 1970: the emergence of the risk concept 
 
In the early years of safety science the concept of risk was not common, as discussed in previous 
articles of this series, more often one spoke of safety technology (Zwaard, 2007). At that time there 
was no risk-based approach that used the concept of ‘probability’. Yet in this early period, the first 
ideas for a risk-based approach emerged. Heinrich (1931) described the occurrence of an accident as 
a separate step of the accident process that lead to effects (injury). This was the basis for the 
domino’s metaphor which he described in 1941. Heinrich discussed the causal relations and the 
severity of effects, but did not explicitly mention the concept of probability. De Blois (1926) introduced 
the theory of likelihood or probability in safety and devoted a chapter to the difference between 
chance and probability. He talked about a shift from a universal belief that "accidents just happen” to 
a new doctrine that "accidents are caused and the relevant causes can be prevented ". He introduced 
the likelihood doctrine as a theory:  
 
"Which deals with the maturity of complex events and brings their occurrence under the exact 
laws as against leaving their happening to random conjecture."...  
 
This is illustrated by the example of the probability of sudden crane failure (1 in 10,000), and the 
probability that an employee who normally works ten minutes of a ten-hour workday under the load, is 
hit by the load when the cable breaks. The combined probability of such an accident is the product of 
both independent probabilities: 1/10.000 X 10 / (10X60) = 1/600.000. De Blois did not mention the 
word risk, but he used some important aspects that would form a central part of the risk-based 
approach in safety years later: predicting or estimating combined incident probabilities and the lack of 
information about the "number of successful operations”.  
The concept of risk was used much earlier in the field of insurance. The first reports relate to 
ship transports in antiquity (Bernstein, 1996). Later the notion of risk in the calculation of life insurance 
premiums was used in the actuarial mathematics. Several historical reviews on risk analysis and 
safety refer to Pierre de Fermat and Blaise Pascal, who in the seventeenth century laid the basis for 
the calculation of probability and thus prepared a path for modern risk analysis (Ale, 2003; Bernstein, 
1996; Saleh et al., 2006). And in the beginning of the twentieth century the axioms of Kolmogorov 
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provided the mathematical foundation for the calculation of the probability of a particular set of 
independent events as the product of the separate probabilities for these events (Kolmogorov, 1956).  
In the period after the First World War we see the idea of probability arising in the areas of 
operational research, reliability engineering, loss prevention, and related fields. These domains have 
evolved independently of each other, as is explained in the next paragraphs.  
 
3.1 Operations research  
Operational research, later known as operations research, arose between 1930 and 1940 and 
provided important data for quantifying risks. Operations research is research that focuses on rational 
decision making based on quantitative models. In the early years, operational research is dedicated to 
the effectiveness of military operations, maximizing profits, minimizing costs, and minimizing risks. In 
1936 the Bawdsey Research Station uses operational research to assess the reliability of the RAF 
radar installations in preparations for war against Germany. Later, other military operations were 
analysed (e.g. bombing Germany). The analyses were based on statistical data analysis and 
probabilistic risk analysis of alternative operations.  
After World War II, a massive upscaling of the (chemical) process industry occurred. 
Increasing production capacities, storage capacities and transportation capacities of hazardous 
materials led to major incidents and public outcry for betterment. The installations of process 
industries appeared increasingly unreliable, and this undesired situation led in the seventies to 
different loss prevention research studies (Pasman and Snijder, 1974; Pasman, 1999). A more 
systemic and scientific approach was needed for the quantification and the management of risks 
(Boersma, 1974; Ale, 2002, 2003).  
 
3.2 Reliability engineering  
Reliability engineering has emerged with the development of mass production and the use of 
standardized components. The origin of the field goes back to the mass production of weapons and 
the introduction of interchangeable parts during the American War of Independence (1775 to 1783) 
and, much later, the mass production in the factories of Henry Ford and the introduction of fragile 
vacuum tubes (diodes and triodes) at the beginning of the last century. Reliability engineering really 
developed after World War II when in 1952 in the United States the Advisory Group on Reliability of 
Electronic Equipment (AGREE) was founded and reliability engineering as a discipline was 
established in 1957 (Coppola, 1984). Reliability engineering made a significant contribution to the 
collection and analysis of failure probabilities of components in technical systems and formed an 
important input for risk assessment in safety studies. This is indicated by two technical standards: TR-
1100, Reliability Stress Analysis for Electronic Equipment (1956) and H-217, Military standard for 
calculation of reliability predictions (1961) (Denson, 1989).  
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The shift to a risk-based approach according to Griffiths was illustrated by a British standard 
(British Standard Glossary of Terms used in Quality Assurance - BS 4778:1979). A probabilistic 
approach was introduced, replacing the traditional practice of safety factors that often amounted to a 
factor 10 of even 100 (Griffiths, 1981).  
 
3.3 Risks of flooding  
In The Netherlands, developments in flood safety had a major impact on the risk-based and 
probabilistic approach in safety science. Van Veen and Wemelsfelder pioneered this work in the 
1930’s in their positions as civil servants in the government agency Rijkswaterstaat (Department of 
Public Works), responsible for the design, construction, management and maintenance of the main 
infrastructure facilities. Their work led to a fundamentally different approach to flood control. In that 
time, it was customary to increase the height of levees to slightly above the level of the last flood. In 
this new approach dike heights were determined by statistical analysis of tidal flood levels. Statistical 
analysis dictated that an absolutely safe dike did not exist but that there was a probabilistic 
relationship between the height of levees or sea dikes and flood risk: the higher the dikes, the smaller 
the risk of flooding. This work paved the way for the warning issued to the government in 1939 of the 
inadequate protection of the levees in the south-west provinces of The Netherlands in storm-force 
winds. The warnings were repeated shortly after World War II (Horn of Nispen, 2001) but to no avail.  
The probabilistic approach was adopted only after the Great Flood of 1953 which caused more 
than 1,800 fatalities. Soon after, the Delta Works project was started and policy decisions for flood 
safety and dike heights were based solely on risk assessments. For a vulnerable part of The 
Netherlands, a village on the west coast (Hoek van Holland) the exceedance probability was 
calculated to be 1/250.000 per year. This eventually translated into a maximum permissible 
exceedance probability of 10-4 per year (defined as the probability that the water height is equal to or 
higher than the dike height (Van Dantzig, 1956; Van Dantzig and Kriens, 1960).  
This approach paved the way for the concept of flood risk as probability times impact. Flood 
risk was defined as the probability of flooding each year multiplied by the amount of damage (defined 
as number of deaths; Ten Brinke and Bannink, 2004). All other policies for flood defence were 
abandoned from that point onward.  
 
3.4 Risks and nuclear energy 
After World War II, commercial nuclear power became available. The United States pioneered the 
public debate about the acceptability of risks of nuclear power plants to local residents and the 
environment. This discussion reached its apex in the 1975 WASH-1400 report (Rasmussen, 1975). 
This report used probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) to demonstrate that the risks associated with 
nuclear power plants were relatively small. The WASH report and its various sub-reports were of 
great importance for the development of quantitative risk analysis in The Netherlands.  
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3.5 Risks in process safety  
Starting from 1975 the Commission for Prevention of Disasters (CPR) published standards for the 
safe storage of hazardous substances in The Netherlands. In the publications of the predecessors of 
this commission, the so-called ‘gasoline commission’ (starting from 1927) and subsequently the 
Commission on Storage of Hazardous Substances (starting from the sixties), sometimes the word risk 
was used, initially without being quantified or even defined. The CPR standards of 1975 mark the 
beginning of a 'risk thinking' within the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.  
However, already during the 1950s and 1960s chemical and petrochemical plants, not only in The 
Netherlands but also in the major industrial countries, had grown much larger than earlier ones and, 
additionally, were operating at higher temperatures and pressures. One result was an increase in 
serious accidents with large losses of capital and human life. This led in to the development of a more 
systematic, comprehensive, and technical approach to safety, known as ‘Loss Prevention’ (Kletz, 
1999). 
 
4. The seventies and eighties: the quantification of risks in The Netherlands  
 
Quantitative risk analysis for hazardous substances took off in The Netherlands in the seventies and 
eighties, building on the previously described national and international developments and insights.  
 
4.1 The need for a quantitative approach  
From the end of the sixties, in The Netherlands a broad debate emerged on the calculation of risk as 
a measure of safety (business, science, government). The focal point of these discussions was on 
dangerous substances particularly when it came to low probability and high impact events (later called 
‘major hazards’). But the discussion went much broader. Social issues were at the heart of the 
discussion for large-scale technological developments, such as the mooring of LNG tankers in the 
harbour of Rotterdam, the construction of LNG pipelines to Germany, the use of LPG in cars this 
leading to the need of LPG refuelling stations, and the development of the chemical industry in 
Eemshaven, in the north east of Holland. Resolving these social issues called for a new approach to 
safety (Ale, 2002, 2003).The new approach should deliver a better understanding of the dispersion of 
hazardous substances in the atmosphere, the type and severity of the potential of such dispersions 
and all forms of damage it could cause. In addition, there was a need for clear definition and 
quantification of the concept of risk and of a criterion for an accepted level of safety.  
The scientific debate about the long term health risks from prolonged low exposure to 
hazardous substances took place mainly in the medical, environmental and industrial hygiene 
disciplines (see 3.11). The discussion about an acceptable risk criterion for exposure to carcinogens 
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showed parallels with the discussion about such a criterion for the risk of a disaster involving 
hazardous substances. Thus the stage was set for change.  
 
4.2 The concept of risk in the process and nuclear industries  
A Dutch congress in 1969 (inherent hazards of manufacturing and storage in the process industry) 
organized by Dutch organizations for chemists and chemical engineers (KNCV and KIVI) and a UK 
conference in 1971 (Major Loss Prevention, in Newcastle) were the predecessors of the first 
European conference on Loss Prevention in 1974 (Pasman and Snijder, 1974). In the opening speech 
at this first European Congress the Dutch Minister of Social affairs Boersma held a plea for the 
development of methods for quantitative risk analysis (Boersma, 1974). The scale up in process 
industries required new insights and methods. New methods were needed to estimate the size and 
probability of potential disasters and devise the necessary measures against them. Boersma stressed 
safety regulations for the process industries was similar to regulation of nuclear power plants, where, 
at that time, the debate centred on the maximum credible accident and resulting risks. Buschmann, a 
chemical consultant working at the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs, spoke about new challenges for 
the process industry and referred to the report "The Limits to Growth" of the Club of Rome in 1972 
(Buschmann, 1974). Far more efficient and cleaner production processes needed to be developed; 
new materials and alternative fuels needed to be applied. At this time society was becoming more 
critical towards the introduction of new technologies which created a need for in-depth analysis 
methods and clear guidelines whether acceptable risk levels were exceeded. In addition to that it was 
important to demonstrate that the benefits of new technologies outweighed the risks they created. 
Buschmann translated this into a challenge for science by asking for quantification of risk. His call had 
immediate effects. Without delay, a research program was started for determining probabilities of 
failure and effect modelling. In the end, this effort led to the so-called coloured books in the CPR 
series (see section 3.6).  
The disasters at Flixborough (1974) and Beek (1975) had a huge impact in The Netherlands. 
DSM, a Dutch company owned the factory in Beek and co-owned the company in Flixborough. Both 
disasters surprised experts and policy makers because the damage from the explosion was far 
beyond the expectations (Marshall, 1987). This led to many questions about the explosion severity of 
released flammable gases and vapours (Cobben et al, 1976). Research on vapour cloud explosions 
had already started in 1968 after an incident at Shell Pernis. But the explosions at Flixborough and 
Beek led to a heightened interest in fundamental research (Groothuizen, 1976). Field experiments in 
the U.S. (Nevada, Texas) and The Netherlands (Mosselbank, TNO) in the seventies gave a first 
insight into the chemical and physical mechanism of a vapour cloud explosion and the conditions 
which could worsen a mild deflagration (explosive combustion) into  a much more violent and 
destructive deflagration, and even to a detonation (i.e. an explosion with supersonic velocity and 
much more powerful than a deflagration). The presence of obstacles, such as piping, was found to be 
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a major factor increasing the destructiveness of gas and vapour explosions (CPR 14E, 1979; Van den 
Berg, 1985).  
The quadrennial Loss Prevention conferences focused on the process industry and process safety 
and therefore were attended largely by safety-oriented engineers and scientists from companies, 
government and universities. Later, quantitative risk analysis also became a central topic in the 
congresses of the SRA (Society for Risk Analysis) and ESRA (European Safety and Reliability 
Association), founded, respectively, in 1980 and 1991. This stimulated further development of the 
theory of risk analysis in various fields of science.  
 
In international perspective a milestone in the development of Loss Prevention was the publication by 
F.P. Lees in 1980 of the encyclopaedic textbook Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. The 
comprehensiveness, quality and utility of this textbook quickly established the importance of Loss 
Prevention within the process industry. Central in Loss Prevention is the concept of risk and 
methodologies for quantifying risk. Lees defined risk as: 
 
Risk is a measure of economic loss or human injury in terms of both the incident likelihood and the 
magnitude of the loss or injury (Lees, 1980)  
 
This quantitative definition of risk became, and still is, the prevailing definition of risk within the 
process industry. According to Lees the extension of  process safety required a reorientation of the 
approach to “safety and loss ". Lees systematically and comprehensively described the relevant body-
of-knowledge, methods, and techniques required in order to prevent damage to property and to 
prevent adverse health effects. He described the methods for quantification of risks and applications 
of reliability engineering. He also criticized the traditional standards and codes for the design of 
installations. The systematic and comprehensive approach in this first edition of this handbook 
illustrates the revolutionary change in approach that the introduction of risk brought into safety 
engineering. Another well-known author who advocated  a quantitative approach was Trevor Kletz 
(1971). 
 
4.3 Debating quantitative risk analysis in separate disciplines  
The turbulent development in the process industries greatly influenced the focus of research and the 
development of theories in safety science. This applies in particular to quantitative risk analysis. In the 
UK, the HSE commissioned a study of the potential hazard to residents in the area of Canvey Island 
(HSE, 1978). Following the British study a risk analysis was conducted in The Netherlands by Cremer 
and Warner (1982), the so-called COVO study. COVO was the abbreviation of Safety Committee of 
residents in the Rijnmond Area (surrounding industrial complexes near Rotterdam). It was the first 
quantitative risk assessment that identified industrial risks to which the residents were exposed in the 
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vicinity of chemical industry parks. The European 'Seveso Directive' - named after an incident in the 
Italian town Seveso (1976) - was for a large part based on research on quantitative risk assessment 
as a follow up of these studies (see section 3.6).  
Alongside the rise of quantitative risk analysis, interest grew in the fields of psychology, 
sociology and public administration concerning the public debate on how to deal with increased risks. 
Dutch researchers Stallen and Vlek (1979), who presented their findings alongside international 
researchers (Slovic et al, 1984; Starr, 1969; Fischhof, 1984), gave various definitions of the concept 
of risk and discussed factors determining for risk perception of local residents (Vlek, 1990). Right from 
the start the social sciences debate strongly influenced the technical-scientific debate on quantitative 
risk analysis. The debate between the more technical-scientific approach to risk and the approach of 
the social sciences is sometimes referred to as the debate between objectivists and constructivists.  
 
4.4 LPG integral study  
In 1978 TNO was commissioned to carry out a study on "the safety of current and future activities 
using LPG in The Netherlands', the so-called LPG integral study" (TNO, 1983). Different methods 
were used in conjunction, including incident analysis, hazard and operability studies (Lawley, 1974), 
fault tree analysis and event tree analysis. Later the methods for calculating physical effects (e.g. 
blast wave of explosion of LPG), assessing failure probabilities, transmission models (e.g. of a toxic 
cloud through air) and models for calculating possible damage (e.g. resulting from exposure to a toxic 
cloud) were further elaborated and recorded in the so-called ‘coloured books’, discussed later.  
The report of the LPG integral study mentions that due to the complexity of the concept of risk, 
three different measures were used to assess both the expected consequences of incidents and the 
likelihood of the occurrence of these consequences:  
 
• The average number of expected deaths  
• The probability that an individual person is killed at a particular location or area  
• The probability that a certain number of people are killed in the total area affected.  
 
Much later (in 2004) the last two measures became the basis for defining the criteria for the individual 
risk at a given location (PR) and the Group Risk (GR)1 in the Dutch Decree on external safety of 
industrial plants (BEVI). These three types of risk were calculated for different types of incidents and 
scenarios. The most serious scenario was the BLEVE, a "Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour 
Explosion". This is an explosion due to failure of a vessel containing a pressurized liquid at a 
                                               
1
 Individual Risk (PR) was defined as: The probability that an individual person is killed at a particular location 
during a period of one year. Group Risk (GR) was defined as: The probability that a certain number of people 
are killed in the total area affected within one year.  
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temperature well above its atmospheric boiling point. With flammable liquids (e.g. propane) the initial 
explosion is usually followed by an intensely burning fireball. Thus, the individual risk of a BLEVE 
followed by a fireball was calculated as the probability of occurrence of an incident BLEVE (10-2 per 
year) multiplied by the probability of a fatality resulting from exposure to the intense heat radiation of 
the fireball.  
 
Figure 1: Effects of a BLEVE followed by a fireball (TNO, 1983)  
 
The researchers extensively discussed the uncertainties of the risk analysis, including uncertainties 
about the design and construction of engineering systems and assumptions about failure probabilities. 
There was uncertainty about the influence of human factors and the probability of occurrence of 
consequences. The authors of the TNO report did not include the social acceptability of the activities 
examined. The reasons the authors stated was that their analysis was limited to a technical risk 
analysis concerning public safety and thus did not include an analysis of other aspects (such as 
environmental and economic aspects) that played a role in political decision making on the use of 
LPG in The Netherlands. Nevertheless, the hard numbers infused into the social debate. 
 
4.5 Quantitative risk analysis published in the Dutch ‘coloured books’  
After the publication of the LPG integral study need grew in The Netherlands for a pooling of the 
knowledge about risk analysis of hazardous substances. Commissioned by the Dutch government 
this knowledge was put together in the so-called "Yellow Book" (CPR 14E,1979) by experts from 
ministries, research institutes and industry. The models presented were based in part on reliable 
scientific knowledge. Blanks or parts of the risk analysis process for which sufficient reliable science 
was lacking, or essential data were missing, were filled with the available rules of thumb. The 
reliability of the effects models was tested in laboratory and field tests. For many years the Yellow 
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Book was internationally used to calculate the consequences of hazardous substance releases in risk 
analysis studies. The methods were mainly used by designers and engineers of industrial plants and 
in quantitative risk analysis aimed at assessing 'safe distances' around industrial plants. Later other 
publications in the same series of 'Coloured books' publications appeared. These treated specific 
aspects of risk analysis.  
The Green Book was the second coloured book following the yellow book (CPR 16, 1989). It 
described damage models for the determination of possible damage to people and property caused 
by the release of hazardous substances. The distinction between effect and damage is based on the 
sequence of the physical effects of release of hazardous substances (e.g. an explosion producing a 
destructive pressure wave (blast)) and the probability of damage caused to the persons or properties 
exposed (e.g. exposed to blast resulting from an explosion). The terms ‘effect’ and ‘damage’ thus 
have different meanings in quantitative risk analysis compared to the same terms in industrial hygiene 
and occupational safety. Instead of the term ‘effect’ the term ‘exposure’ is used in industrial hygiene. 
And the term ‘effect’ in occupational safety and industrial hygiene is used for damage (to health and 
property).  
The Green book described effect models for calculation of transmission of released 
substances in different incident scenarios. Thus, for a toxic gas release in a specific scenario the 
expected gas concentration as a function of time at a certain distance from the source could be 
calculated. In the damage models these data were used to determine the risk (i.e. probability of 
death) for persons exposed to given concentrations for a given time duration. Damage models were 
also called vulnerability models. These damage models were based on laboratory animal tests and 
military injury data from explosions and data on the effects of poison gas in World War I and later.  
The third book in the series, the Red book (CPR 12E, 1988), focused on the analysis of failure 
probabilities, such as the failure rates of individual technical components (e.g. valves, pipes) in order 
to determine the risk of failure of a technical system. This analysis began with an analysis of the 
incident probability. This was based on hazard identification and potential accident scenarios and the 
chain of events leading up to an incident. In addition, both the potential effect as and the potential 
damage have certain probabilities. These probabilities were included in the calculation of the risk. 
Figure 2, taken from the Red Book, gives the schematic representation of the quantitative risk 
analysis process.  
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Figure 2: Schematic representation of the quantitative risk analysis (CPR 12 E, 1988)  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, the models in the coloured books were hardly used to assess the safety (safety 
in terms of risk!) of employees. In fact the risk-based approach entered the occupational safety field 
only years later (see section 4.8 and 5.3). The fourth book in the series (Purple book) will be 
discussed in section 5.1. 
 
4.6 Criticism of quantitative risk analysis 
The theoretical models of the quantitative risk analysis - fault trees, dispersion models and effects and 
damage models - were tested as far as possible with real data and adjusted. Field experiments, 
including those in The Netherlands, gave input for improving dispersion models and better 
understanding of vapour cloud explosions (Siccama, 1973; CPR, 1982). Detailed research after 
incidents (such as the LPG disaster in Mexico) was used to improve the damage models (Pietersen, 
2009). The models and fault trees formed an important basis for quantitative risk analysis. But the 
uncertainties were large, as shown by the criticism of Canvey Island report (Cremer and Warner, 
1980; Warner, 1981; TNO, 1983).  
Expert judgment had a great influence on the estimation of the failure probabilities. The lack of 
reliable data on failure rates and failure frequencies was in fact already noted by De Blois in 1926 
(see section 3). This remains a weak point in the analysis to this day. After all, whilst the result of a 
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risk assessment is dependent on the analyst it is not completely objective. Databases on the reliability 
of system components were and remain essential for carrying out a QRA. In England oil and chemical 
companies and Ministry of Defence (UK) and the power industry made their data available through 
the Systems Reliability Service (SRS) of the UKAEA (United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority SRS. 
In the first generation models for quantitative risk analysis, component failure probability data were 
limited, and, out of necessity, were extended for wider application (e.g. failure probabilities for 
pressure vessels and process vessels) based on expert judgment. (Pasman, 2011). Doubts can be 
raised about such a procedure, since it is the numerical values of failure probabilities that largely 
determine the outcome of quantitative risk analysis.  
The criticism of QRA has never ceased. The Hazardous Substances Advisory Council in The 
Netherlands criticized the software program used for calculation of individual risk and societal risk by 
the Dutch government as late as 2010 (Hazardous Substances Council, 2010). 
 
4.7 Risk perception  
Research in the field of risk perception, risk acceptance, and decision analysis flanked the 
development of QRA. Stallen and Tomas (1985), for example, described the development of social 
science research aimed at distinguishing between objective and subjective risks in the public debate 
on industrial risks and nuclear power. 
The scientific debate on risk perception in the vicinity of industrial plants was conducted by a 
wide range of social scientists, economists and psychologists. The definition of risk was an important 
aspect of the debate. In 1977, the central question for a social scientist studying risk was not how 
risky something was, but how acceptable a risky activity was (Rowe, 1977). This in contrast to the 
more technical-scientific view of QRA, which was – and still is - based on a distinction between risk 
quantification i.e. how big is the risk? (with risk expressed in terms of adverse effects and probabilities 
– both quantitatively) and risk assessment, i.e. is the risk acceptable?. However, for several reasons 
social scientists were questioning this distinction.  
Psychological field studies showed that various aspects of  risk  determine the risk perception 
of citizens (Slovic et al, 1984; Starr, 1969; Vlek and Stallen, 1979; Rowe 1977). The relevance of a 
comparison of risks, based on QRA, was therefore questioned. Risk was a multi-dimensional concept 
with dimensions that were weighted differently by different groups of stakeholders (Vlek, 1990). The 
most important cognitive dimensions are:  
 
• Potential harm or lethality of a release or spill;  
• Controllability by safety and control management;  
• Number of persons affected simultaneously;  
• Awareness of effects and consequences;  
• Voluntariness of exposure and risk 
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• Type of harm caused and relative fear (e.g. causing cancer is highly feared)  
 
According to Vlek (1990) personal risk acceptance was mainly determined by the interest in the 
intended or expected benefits, the severity of a (maximum) credible accident, and the supposed 
process-controllability of the activity (including incidents and effects).  
 
Figure 3: Risk comparison based on the frequency and consequences of human-
induced events (Rasmussen, 1975)  
 
Fischhoff and colleagues (1984) argued that there was no definition of risk which fitted for all 
applications, and the choice of a particular definition was actually a political choice. Risks could not be 
distinguished from the perceived benefits for citizens of a particular activity (Stallen and Tomas, 
1985). The debate on nuclear power was thus a part of a Battle Royal over social choices for future 
energy supply.  
A major point of criticism from psychology concerned the comparison of different types of risks as was 
made, for example in the WASH 1400 report in 1975. Rasmussen (1975) used a graph comparing 
common risks –accurately known because of widely available data – with the - on the basis of QRA - 
calculated individual risk for an incident with a nuclear power plant. The graph clearly shows that the 
calculated risks of nuclear power are much smaller than many common risks (see Figure 3). This 
graph was used by many proponents of nuclear energy to ‘prove’ its safety, and thus the acceptability 
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of nuclear energy. It strengthened their argument that those who opposed nuclear energy on grounds 
of safety issues were ‘not rational’. A  fundamental flaw in this use of QRA, which compares  
calculated results of very different types of risk and was used to ‘prove’ acceptability,  was neglecting 
the big differences in risk characteristics of the various types of risk considered. This approach did not 
take account of how the general public actually perceives ‘risk’, which occurs in a much more multi-
faceted framework than the ‘reductionist’ engineering view of risk.  Therefore risk acceptance was not 
reflected by the presented figures. Thus the criticism from psychology referred to the framing of the 
risk concept and to omitting  several important cognitive dimensions. 
 
There was also criticism from another field about this comparison of risks based on QRA because of 
the uncertainties involved. The probabilities of the non-nuclear disasters shown in the graph are 
based on real (i.e. historical) data, and thus had a known reliability. The probabilities of nuclear 
disasters, however, are calculations based on theoretical models untested by historical data; their 
reliability is therefore unknown. The report by Cremer and Warner (1980), cited earlier in this article, 
pointed out the several substantial uncertainties in estimating probabilities and consequences. The 
authors stressed the need to report these uncertainties, including the influence of the human factor, 
when discussing the results of a QRA. The quote below summarizes three important sources of 
uncertainty:  
 
a. “Application of event and fault tree analysis, can never be shown to represent every possible 
outcome; there can always be some failure sequence that has not been accounted for. This is like 
throwing a pair of dice with an unknown number of faces.  
b. The magnitude of the consequence cannot be exactly calculated; various sources of uncertainty 
enter the problem. This is like thrown dice where the numbers on the faces are not exact, but are 
thought to be within certain ranges. The number actually on one particular face is not revealed 
until the throw is made.  
c. Only certain elements of the system can be experimented with to test the model. Reliability data 
for some components, may be available, but other necessary information is inaccessible. This is 
like throwing dice where only some of the numbers on the faces are known in advance (Griffiths, 
1981).” 
 
4.8 Risk based approach in occupational safety in The Netherlands 
In the seventies and eighties the monthly Dutch safety journal ‘De Veiligheid’ published the first 
articles discussing the concept of risk and the benefits of a risk-based approach. At that time there 
was no experience with the concepts of probability and risk in occupational safety in The Netherlands. 
The legislation and the usual jargon only used the term 'danger'.  
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Smit (1971) argued for a risk-based approach, because accident statistics were inadequate for 
policy purposes and were even misleading. Other methods were required to determine whether the 
safety of a certain workplace was acceptable. Smith introduced the concept of risk very carefully, 
stating, for example: "We could call risk the product of severity multiplied by probability”. A major 
impact of the risk-based approach is the subsequent necessity of accepting a particular risk, as it is 
usually not possible to reduce the risk to zero. When discussing acceptable risk criteria he refers to 
the criteria used in The Netherlands for flood risk. From that point onward, acceptable risk criteria and 
of the impossibility of zero risk formed important parts of the debate.  
A number of articles in the journal ‘De Veiligheid’ reflected on discussions occurring during 
several conferences about the risk-based approach (Van der Leij, 1977; Van der Leij and Mutgeert, 
1977). Notable was a paper of Van Trier presented at the safety congress in Amsterdam in 1975 (Van 
Trier, 1975). He changed the original lecture title from "The requirement of maximum safety as a 
challenge for the engineer" into "Safety and risks in technical systems". Van Trier addressed several 
key issues in the introduction of the concept of risk in his lecture, such as 100% safety does not exist. 
He urged the development of a systematic method for risk analysis that incorporates the loss of life, 
property damage, and social and ecological costs. The degree of voluntariness should be included in 
the acceptable risk criteria. Van Trier mentioned 10-6 [probability of accidental death per year] as a 
generally accepted criterion for citizens in voluntary risks. The criteria for involuntary risks should be a 
factor 1,000 lower. Van Trier uses the same factor published in the study of Starr (1969) in which a 
criterion for involuntary risk should be comparable to the risk of death by natural disasters, namely 10-
9
 [probability of death by natural disaster per year]. This probability figure differs a factor 1000 from 
figures mentioned by Buschman (1972) or Kletz (1981), see section 4.9. 
The introduction of risk analysis would require a lot of explanation in the years following van 
Trier’s 1975 lecture in Amsterdam. Even with a seemingly tiny calculated risk a particular incident 
could nevertheless occur tomorrow. And something that seemed rationally acceptable was in fact 
emotionally often not acceptable. The discussion following the reading of Van Trier illustrates this:  
 
"Once we start doing risk analysis, and we have assessed the risk of a particular activity or a 
particular machine or a certain substance, and subsequently we know that something bad can 
happen with a certain probability, this often raises the question: so it can also happen 
tomorrow? and that question actually creates a kind of emotional atmosphere in which the risk 
suddenly becomes unacceptable.  
 
In The Netherlands around 1990 a risk ranking method was introduced in occupational safety 
(Henstra, 1992). The method was based on publications of Fine (1971) and Kinney et al (1976). QRA 
is usually applied to calculate a risk with a low probability and high impact. Occupational safety within 
companies, however, usually involved risks with relatively large probabilities and relatively small 
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effects. In 1971 Fine presented a method for a simple and semi-quantitative risk assessment suitable 
for these risk categories. The method was further developed by Kinney and Wiruth in 1976 (Fine, 
1971; Kinney et al, 1976). In two brief reports, the authors presented a method for determining the 
relative seriousness of hazards to support the priorities setting for control measures.  
In particular, Fine (1971) discussed the evidence supporting the method. The method was 
tested in the laboratory, comparing the risk-ranking performed independently by several experts, thus 
calibrating the ranking method. Based on these risk rankings, the different types and levels of risk 
were classified with a certain weight and valuation. According to the author this classification could 
require adjustment in the course of time due to change of insights. The author also stressed that the 
method is suitable for ranking risks within a given organization. 
The severity of the risk was assessed based on the potential consequences of an incident, 
exposure or frequency of occurrence of a dangerous situation (which can lead to an incident), and the 
probability that such a dangerous situation could lead to an incident with these consequences. The 
word scenario was not used, but the method did not allow combining the assessment of several 
different consequences, because the frequency of exposure and the probability would differ. The 
method is semi-quantitative. Thus, the probability was not calculated as a product of the probability of 
successive events, but was estimated as the probability of a sequence of the respective events 
occurring after each other. The risk score was calculated by the following formula:  
 
Risk score = probability x exposure x consequences 
 
The method presented a rating scale of six of seven categories for each of the three factors. For each 
factor the two extremes were first determined, such as the most serious and least serious 
consequence. Then, the intermediate categories were used for the other possible consequences, with 
the distance between the categories plotted on a logarithmic scale. The assessment of the possible 
consequences included both personal injury and property damage (see Figure 4).  
 
Likelihood Value 
Might well be expected 10 
Quite possible 6 
Unusual but possible 3 
Only remotely possible 1 
Conceivable but very unlikely 0.5 
Practically impossible 0.2 
Virtually impossible 0.1 
Exposure Value 
Continuous 10 
Frequent (daily) 6 
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Occasional (weekly) 3 
Unusual (monthly) 2 
Rare (a few per year) 1 
Very rare (yearly) 0.5 
Possible consequence Value 
Catastrophe (many fatalities, or > 107 USD damage) 100 
Disaster (few fatalities, or >  106 USD damage) 40 
Very serious (fatality, or > 105 USD damage) 15 
Serious (serious injury, or >104 USD damage) 7 
Important (disability, or > 103 USD damage) 3 
Noticeable (minor first aid accident, or > 100 USD damage) 1 
Risk situation Risk score 
Very high risk; consider discontinuing operation >400 
High risk; immediate correction required 200 to 400 
Substantial risk; correction needed 70 to 200 
Possible risk; attention indicated 20 to 70 
Risk; perhaps acceptable <20 
 
 
Figure 4: Risk ranking in occupational safety (Kinney et al,1976) 
 
Both Fine and Kinney and Wiruth presented the method as a tool for decision support to determine 
the priority for intervention. With additionally, Fine (1971) argued that routine safety inspections and 
investigations yielded long lists of hazards, and therefore that the cost of control measures should be 
justified on the basis of risk instead of the persuasiveness of a safety expert.  
This method was more dependent on expert judgement than the QRA methods which were 
based, partly, on data of fault tree analysis and effect analysis. The risk scores of different types of 
industry could not be compared and the method was only suitable for ranking risks within a given 
organization as stressed by Fine (1971). 
 
 
4.9 The acceptability of risks  
QRA was meant to support decisions on risk acceptability. As mentioned earlier (Par. 4.7; in 
particular, Figure 3), based on a quantitative risk analysis the American National Radiation Council 
(NRC) argued in 1975 that the probability of death to the public caused by an incident occurring at a 
nuclear power plant is acceptable, because this risk is much smaller than other generally accepted 
risks associated with dam breaks or air-travel (Rasmussen, 1975). This argument drew criticism 
because the risks were not comparable (Griffiths, 1981). Another point of criticism was the 
incompleteness of the scenario analysis, but this objection was also applicable to the risk analysis of 
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industrial risks, with which the nuclear risks were compared by Rasmussen (Kaplan and Garrick, 
1981).  
Buschmann (1972) considered a mortality rate of 10-7 per year to be negligible. He based this 
on an accepted probability level for flooding achieved by Dutch coastal protection. At that time the 
Dutch parliament had decided upon an acceptable accident probability. This had been done when 
discussing the necessary height of levees along the coast protecting the country against flooding 
during storms. Balancing the costs of raising the dikes to different levels resulted in an accepted 
probability of flooding in the coastal areas to once in 10,000 years (10-4). At a mortality rate of about 
1:1000(10-3) in a flood, this gives a mortality rate per inhabitant per year of 1 x 10-7. This is 1/10 of the 
probability of death due to natural disasters in the United States. " 
Zielhuis (1984) addressed a number of tough questions in that period in determining the 
acceptable risk from occupational exposure to carcinogens. What was needed were quantitative 
standards for acceptable exposure limits; it was insufficient to state that the exposure "should be as 
low as possible." There was thus a need for reliable standard setting that could be reviewed and 
validated by third parties. These standards for exposure limits should be based on transparent criteria 
for preventing unacceptable health effects in general or, more specifically, for preventing specific 
health effects for calculated fraction of employees at an exposure of 8 hours per day, 5 days a week 
for an entire working life. Earlier the Health Council of The Netherlands (1978) had published a report 
on carcinogenicity of chemicals, and one of the first recommendations of the Dutch Expert 
Commission (WGD) also involved the assessment of the risks of carcinogens. Zielhuis, involved in 
both publications, discussed in detail the many questions involved in setting standards, at such as 
variation between individuals, variation in daily exposure, and extrapolation of results of animal 
experiments to humans. Zielhuis (1984) ended his publication as follows: "from both of the Dutch 
Expert Commission of the Ministry of Social Affairs  (WGD) as well as the occupational physicians in 
practice, a response is expected in areas that even angels are reluctant to tread”. The Health Council 
of The Netherlands and the WGD (1979, 1980) distinguished between two categories of substances: 
 
1. Substances causing an irreversible self-replicating effect, i.e., causing a permanent change of 
structure in the DNA: initiators  
2. Substances that are active through other mechanisms: promoters or co-carcinogens.  
 
This distinction was crucial for setting acceptable limits as it explicitly stated that for the first category 
of substances no safe threshold could be determined. While for the second category a safe threshold 
could be established based on a no-effect-level. For the first category of substances the one-hit 
principle was introduced, meaning: one single molecule of the substance in question in one 
interaction with a cell can initiate an effect, a change in DNA, causing, with a certain probability, 
cancer to develop. This one-hit principle was adopted from knowledge of health effects of ionizing 
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radiation. For exposure to the first category carcinogenic substances the WGD presented a basis for 
calculating acceptable risk, as follows: exposure to x micrograms/m3, for 8 hours per day, 5 days per 
week, for 35 years, results in a probability of developing a specific form of cancer in 1 in 10,000 
employees. By linear extrapolation from this basis and after balancing various interests the Dutch 
national committee for occupational standard setting could establish an exposure limit that 
corresponded to a certain accepted risk.  
Zielhuis (1984) referred to the Scientific Committee of the Food Safety Council in the U.S. that 
bases its standards on a 'near-zero' risk of 10-6 to a lifetime exposure of the general population. The 
Food Safety Council proposed this value as a measure of a negligible risk, Later this same value (10-
6) appeared in many different policy areas as a criterion for acceptable risk (Kelly, 1991). For the first 
category of carcinogens the Dutch government applied the same criterion as used for ionizing 
radiation: a maximum probability of death of 10 -6 per year. Only in the case of carcinogenic 
substances was this an accepted risk limit whereas for ionizing radiation it was  a target value 
representing a negligible risk. 
On the origin of the value of 10-6 per year as a negligible risk level many different views can be found 
in the literature. Wildavsky (2008) argued that the 10-6 criterion had largely a symbolic value. Others 
mentioned that the limit was based on the belief that the acceptable risk of an industrial activity should 
not exceed the risks of natural hazards citizens are exposed to, such as floods, earthquakes, and 
lightning, which are around (or less than) 10-6(Kletz, 1981).  
 
 
5. The period after 1990: Risk becoming an accepted concept  
 
In the period after 1990, risk and risk-based approaches for safety were accepted and established in 
The Netherlands. At that time the textbook series ‘Coloured books’ formed a complete methodology 
for carrying out quantitative risk analysis (QRA) in the area of hazardous substances and received 
much international recognition. Also in the field of delayed health effects, in particular cancer caused 
by exposure to carcinogens, the concept of risk was a basic term used in setting standards for 
exposure to toxic chemicals. In the Dutch occupational safety domain the introduction of the so-called 
Risk Inventory and Evaluation (RI&E) procedures into the occupational health and safety legislation 
caused the concept of risk to become a central item in virtually all discussions of safety (Zwaard, 
2007).  
 
5.1 Process Safety: quantitative risk analysis methods combined in textbook series  
The fourth and final part of the textbook series ‘Coloured books’, the Purple Book (CPR 18, 1999), 
was published at the end of the nineties. The Purple Book included calculation rules and criteria for 
performing a QRA. Criteria were given for deciding which installations of a certain industrial plant 
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should be part of a QRA and which could be excluded. This final publication in particular has been 
strongly criticized. The publication presented the agreements on selecting the installations to be 
analysed, determination of the relevant occurrences of LOC (Loss Of Containment), relevant 
subsequent events, corresponding effect and damage calculations, and, finally, presentation of the 
results. The Purple Book presents the Dutch approach, which is based on criteria of only considering 
"containments" with more than a certain amount of a specific hazardous substance. Subsequently, for 
these containments the probability of failure was determined, based on historical data. A more 
thorough, but also time-consuming method, is a systematic identification of hazards, describing and 
analysing relevant detailed scenarios using Hazard and Operability Studies (failure analysis). These 
methods were available at that time (Lawley, 1974). A QRA based on a previously carried out hazard 
identification and HAZOP would give a better view of the failure probabilities, of conditions and 
process data specific to the site in question, on relevant human behaviour, and on where and how 
safety could be improved. The Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment has always been 
highly in favor of the latter approach. Later also research was initiated to add management as a 
modifying factor in the QRA (Sol, 2011).   
From the start and first drafts of the 'coloured books' much discussion took place about the 
uncertainties of the models used. Uncertainty in the parameters of the effect models gave variations 
in the results of a factor of two to six. The damage models also contained large uncertainties. The 
green book mentions model uncertainties (inter-individual variation and differences between 
buildings) and parameter uncertainties (population data, toxicity data, and the influence of escape 
behavior on exposure time). These uncertainties resulted in a large variation in the final calculated 
risk. When comparing different research teams, the calculated risk varied by orders of magnitude 
(Lemkowitz et al, 1995; Pasman, 2011) with large differences for the risk contour around an 
installation (Hazardous Substances Council, 2010).  
 
5.2 Exposure to carcinogenic substances: basis for determining an acceptable risk level 
A standard for a maximum acceptable risk for exposure to genotoxic substances was proposed by the 
Dutch board for occupational health and safety in 1992 in an advisory report. The Board referred to 
the ministerial memorandum ‘Dealing with risks of radiation; ionizing radiation limits for workplaces 
and the environment' from 1990 (Ministry of Housing, 1990). In the Board delegates from employers 
and employees had different opinions about the maximum difference in risk level between the general 
population and labour force employers and employees:  
 
"The delegates of the employees believe that the risk for workers in the field should be equal 
to that of the general public, i.e. 10-6 per year. (...) The employer delegates (...) are of the 
opinion that the standard risk limit of incidents with fatal result in the so-called safe industry 
should be used, namely 10-4 per year (...)". 
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The Board proposed to strive for a risk level for each substance of 10-6 per year (the so-called target 
level) and in any case not to accept a higher risk of maximum 10-4 per year (the so-called banning 
level). 
 
5.3 Occupational safety: introduction of the concept of risk inventory and evaluation (RI&E)  
In 1989, the concept of risk was formally introduced into the Dutch occupational safety domain 
through with publication of the EC Framework Directive ‘Safety and Health at Work’. In the EU 
Directive, the main elements of risk were defined. Anticipating on the implementation of the EC 
Framework Directive (EC, 1989) in The Netherlands methods for risk ranking and semi-quantitative 
assessment of risks as described above (section 4.8) were being used increasingly by safety 
engineers in The Netherlands when performing the risk assessment and evaluation (RI&E) that would 
be anchored in the Dutch health and safety legislation from 1994 (Henstra, 1992). The Dutch 
regulation spoke moreover not yet of ‘risk,’ but of an ”inventory and assessment of hazards, while the 
European Framework spoke only of risks. Only in 1999 (when the Working Conditions Act 1998 came 
into force) did the word "risk" appear for the first time, in Article 5 of the Working Conditions Act 
(Zwaard, 2009).  
 
6. Discussion and conclusions  
 
We begin this section on providing answers to the three research questions presented earlier, 
namely:  
1. What developments were decisive for introducing the concept of risk in safety science in The 
Netherlands?  
2. Which theories, models, and metaphors were developed in the considered period (1970-1990)?  
3. What differences exist between the introduction of the concept of risk into occupational safety and 
into process safety?  
Thereafter we provide some additional discussion and concluding remarks. 
 
6.1 Developments decisive for introducing the concept of risk in safety science in The Netherlands 
In the seventies several factors urged for the introduction of the concept of risk into the Dutch safety 
science field. With the rapid industrial development and up scaling of the process industry the number 
of incidents increased. These developments required a rationale for decisions concerning the 
prevention of losses in the process industry. The land use planning with development of new 
industrial plants, the possibility of major consequences of an incident and the introduction of new 
technologies (nuclear energy production, introduction of new fuels like LPG) were the subject of a 
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public debate. The research focused on quantification of risk as a basis for better controllability and 
acceptability of these developments (Pasman and Snijder, 1974; Ale, 2002 en 2003).  
The risk-based approach was seen as a rational tool for decision making about investments for 
additional control measures (Buschman, 1972). The large scale introduction of LPG as a motor fuel 
and the development of industrial Rijnmond area were the first cases where QRA methods were 
applied in The Netherlands. The calculation of the risk served to aid decisions on process adjustment 
or safety improvement.  
Right from the start of the development of QRA in The Netherlands psychological research on risk 
perception challenged the assumption that the results of this risk analysis formed a sufficient basis to 
decide on the acceptability of risks (Vlek and Stallen, 1979). This psychological approach challenged 
the identification of scenarios as well as the comparability of different effects.  
But perhaps the most revolutionary aspect of the introduction of the concept of risk was the societal 
debate on the fact that absolute safety is an ‘idee fixe’ (Smit, 1971; Buschmann 1972). A risk-based 
approach inevitably introduced the debate on the acceptability of a certain risk level and of the 
combination of both probability of unwanted effects and the possible benefits (Buschmann, 1972).  
 
6.2 Theories, models, and metaphors developed in the considered period (1970-1990)  
In the QRA methods several existing models (HAZOP and fault tree analysis) were combined and   
developed. Effect and damage models were newly developed specifically for the scenarios 
considered and related to fire, explosion, and/or toxic effects. In all these scenarios, the properties of 
hazardous substances played an important role; indeed, the theme “hazardous materials” played a 
pioneering role in the use of risk models used in QRA (CPR 1982; TNO 1983).  
The probabilistic approach developed in flood risk management formed one of the fundaments 
for the QRA approach in The Netherlands. But the scenario analysis in flood risk management was 
restricted to the overflowing of the dikes and no other damage models were used. Whereas in QRA 
the fault tree analyses were used from the operation research approach and failure probability figures 
were based on input from process industries and from the reports on the nuclear industry.  
The development of QRA was based on the theoretical concept of risk as a product of 
probability and effect and the calculation of the probability of a particular set of independent events, 
the axioma of Kolmogorov (1956). This concept of risk changed the safety approach in The 
Netherlands in process safety as well as in flood safety. Quantification of risk formed the new basis 
for decisions on prioritizing various safety measures. 
The introduction of the concept of risk resulted also in a debate about the process of risk 
assessment. Several variations of this process (see figure 2 as an example) were used but they all 
clearly distinguished between two fundamentally different questions, namely: 1. How large is the risk? 
(e.g. with what probability will which number of people be killed?)1, and 2. Is this risk (quantified and 
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thus known) acceptable or not acceptable?2 The successive steps of the risk assessment process are 
summarized as follows:  
The first question was the subject of the QRA3. This was seen as a scientific procedure which, 
in theory, can result in an absolutely correct numerical answer. In practice, however, many 
uncertainties exist due to the complexity of the calculations involved. These usually involve choosing 
certain scenarios (maybe certain scenarios are missed), making many assumptions (some of which 
may be incorrect or not be applicable), choosing models (which are always simplifications of reality), 
and using imperfect data (e.g. data missing, incomplete, or incorrect). Thus the reliability of methods 
and tools used is open to question and the correctness of the calculated risk cannot be proved. The 
QRA was at that time the best available knowledge. But the epistemological question, i.e. the 
question of “reliable knowledge”: “What is true?” was difficult to answer with I.e. is the numerical value 
of the calculated risk valid/reliable? Is it true? 
The second question about the risk acceptability was seen as a societal issue. This question 
involves the ethical question "What is good?"(i.e. is accepting the risk (ethically)a good or a bad 
decision?). In practice, however, the difference between these two basic questions was not always 
recognized. The risk assessment and eventually the risk perception was often an important political 
issue. Debates about the outcome of a QRA often challenged the validity/reliability of the calculated 
risk as well as the acceptability of the risk.  
6.3 Differences between the introduction of the concept of risk into occupational safety and into 
process safety 
The introduction in the occupational safety field in The Netherlands was delayed by another ten years 
compared to the major hazard industries. It was introduced in that domain through the assessment of 
exposure to carcinogenic substances. But in occupational safety, the introduction of risk also initiated 
a fundamentally different way of thinking. In the years before, the notion of hazard had been the 
central factor in the safety approach of the professional field of safety technology and in occupational 
safety regulation. The introduction of the concept of risk added a nuance to the concept of safety: 
Since absolute safety does not exist, discussions about acceptance of risk levels were forced upon 
occupational safety experts. This weakened the negotiation position that occupational safety experts 
had in efforts to convince corporations to invest in greater safety. This weakening of negotiating 
position was the major reason why the concept of (and word) risk was not formally incorporated into 
the Dutch health and safety regulation until the end of the last century. 
Around 1990, when risk analysis established in most safety-related domains, the need arose 
for ranking different risk or dangerous situations at the workplace. This was even more challenging 
                                               
2
 “Is the risk acceptable or not acceptable?” is related to another type of fundamental philosophical question (the 
ethical question): “What is good?” I.e. is accepting this risk ‘morally good’ or ‘morally not good’ (thus ‘bad’)? 
3
 How large is the risk?” is related to a fundamental philosophical question (the epistemological question, i.e. the 
question of “reliable knowledge”): “What is true?” I.e. is the numerical value of the calculated risk valid/reliable? 
Is it true? 
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than introducing risk into the process industries, as the workplace situation involves not only risks of 
hazardous substances, but a multitude of types of safety risks involved in the general working 
situation (e.g. from falling off a ladder in the construction industry to being electrocuted when repairing 
high voltage power lines). 
In occupational safety the introduction of the concept of risk as a function of probability and 
impact provided a rational basis for ranking of different hazardous situations. In occupational safety 
there was no debate on whether to broaden the concept of risk and including risk perception, such as 
had been suggested by a number of psychologists studying around process safety and external 
safety. The main reason for this seems to be that the calculated risk was not used to assess the 
absolute acceptability of situations, but was used only comparing different hazardous situations.  
The semi-quantitative methods, as described by both Fine (1971) and Kinney and Wiruth (1976) were 
widely used in The Netherlands after the implementation of the EC Framework Directive. It is striking 
that this acceptance had occurred with hardly any debate occurring on the reliability and 
reproducibility of these methods.  
 
 
6.4 Additional discussion and concluding remarks  
 
Development of quantitative models 
The development of QRA represents a major change in the field of safety, in which in post-World War 
II period the psychological approach had been replaced by epidemiological models (Haddon) and 
accident theories (Winsemius). Moreover it is a period, in which practical application still considered 
human failure to be the dominant explanation for the occurrence of accidents (Swuste et al, 2014b). In 
this light, it is noteworthy that QRA is mainly based on technical failure of equipment. Thus a first 
criticism of QRA arose, namely the lack of consideration of human factors and management, which 
was regularly cited in publications. However, in the 1980s, advocates of QRA did not consider it 
practicable to quantify human failure and failing management (Griffiths, 1981), although among others 
Kletz (1981) advocated  including the probability of human error and the quality of management within 
the incident scenarios calculation, even if these factors could only be roughly estimated4. 
A second criticism of QRA concerns the restriction of the analysis to conceivable scenarios. 
The risk assessment is therefore largely determined by the choice of scenarios, thus also those not 
chosen; in other words, the chosen system boundaries. Methodologies for systematic hazard 
                                               
4
 In the next article from this series the period (starting from1990) of safety management system and safety 
culture is discussed, when research focused in particular on the human factor (Swuste et al, 2015).. 
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identification (e.g. HAZOP) and scenario analysis improved the reliability and reproducibility of QRA 5. 
The choice of the scenarios reflect the borderline area between uncertainty and risk, such as Knight in 
1921 and Keynes in 1937already discussed (Bernstein, 1996; p 249-265).. If we see risk as a 
measurable uncertainty, we must clearly distinguish it from the non-measurable uncertainties. Knight 
cited examples of predictions about future developments that are highly tricky. In the area of safety 
there are such unimaginable scenarios, which may nevertheless occur, but which are not considered 
in the QRAs. The distinction made by Knight and Keynes between risk and uncertainty is still relevant 
in the discussion about safety. An example is the question of who is liable for the damage after a 
disaster when the company concerned cannot be blamed. The WRR (2008), a Dutch advisory board, 
has raised this question. Hazards that are not recognized, scenarios that are inconceivable, are, after 
all, not considered in QRAs. The current Dutch liability legislation is based on the risks that have been 
estimated, not those which have not been considered. The expansion of liability that the WRR 
proposes concerns such uncertainties – uncertainties for which no prior estimates can be made, but 
which nevertheless later turn out to be linked to the cause. 
 
Risk as a new paradigm 
QRA paved the way for a new safety paradigm. In the safety science domain  QRA became the basis 
for safety evaluations and acceptance in high-risk industries. Still serious improvements in methods 
were needed. At the same time a more fundamental debate about the use of this risk concept in 
societal decisions on risk acceptance  was started by social science disciplines as well as within the 
safety science. 
Risk as a concept (or model) based on a combination of probability and impact became widely 
accepted in many fields, including safety engineering. Models and tools based on this concept of risk 
are much used,  particularly in the area of hazardous substances and hazardous installations (e.g. 
chemical plants, nuclear facilities). These tools provide a more reliable and substantiated way to 
quantify risk (risk assessment) than those tools which existed before use of the concept of risk 
became widespread. However, uncertainties, in particular estimations of failure probabilities, 
insufficiencies in data, and inadequacies of models (physical and biological) still cause large 
variations in the calculated risk. The choice whether or not to consider certain scenarios and the 
definition of system boundaries also can greatly influence the calculated risk. The building blocks for 
QRA were actually formed in the period under consideration (1970 to 1990), but in the quest for more 
knowledge and better understanding about what can harm us there is most certainly room for 
improvement (Hazardous Substances Council, 2010).  
                                               
5
 Much later methodologies from occupational safety, such as the bowtie model, story builder method, and 
GISAI, further improved QRA. However, the time period that these methodologies were introduced into QRA 
falls outside the time period considered in this article (Fisher, 1998; Sol, 2011).  
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This article discusses  the debate both in the safety science domain about the reliability of QRA and in 
social sciences about the more fundamental issue of using the risk concept for societal decisions on 
risk acceptability. Buschmann (1972) advocated a risk-based approach to get a clear criterion for the 
acceptable limit of risk and to evaluate all the social implications of any new technological 
development, including risk, in advance. Griffiths (1981) added more nuances and also recognized 
the need that technological activity with the potential to cause damage requires an informed (risk-
based) choice of the best technology or justification of investment in security. Dobben (1976) 
considered quantitative risk evaluation as a step in the process of safety management. Griffiths 
(1981) advocated using the concept of risk in which different points of view can also be taken into 
consideration, since involvement of various stakeholders, often with different interests, influences their 
judgment of a risk assessment and their acceptance of a given risk. The debate on whether or not to 
fully encompass the concept of risk into a number influenced the debate about the role of the risk-
concept in safety in The Netherlands. The publications of Vlek and Stallen (1979) on risk perception 
contributed to this debate and started the discussion in The Netherlands about a risk concept that 
incorporated important cognitive dimensions. 
 
The publication of Rowe (1977) had a central place in the reference list of the LPG study 
(TNO, 1983) and the textbook series ‘Coloured books’. Already at the end of the seventies Rowe 
suggested that the quantification of risks (risk quantification) is just as important as the judging 
whether a given quantified risk is acceptable or not acceptable (risk acceptance). Rowe noted further 
that the subjective perception of risk is the basis of societal acceptance of risk, regardless of the 
(objectively determined) quantified risk. 
 
"One school holds that probabilities are primarily reflections of the actual frequency of 
occurrence of events; Therefore probabilities are objective. Another school holds that the 
assignment of probabilities primarily reflects the assigner's belief or confidence that the events 
in question will occur "(Rowe, 1977).  
 
It is here in fact argued that the sharp distinction between risk quantification and the judgment of 
whether risk is acceptable cannot be made. In the eighties pleas were regularly made calling for a 
clearer distinction between the objective process of risk quantification and subjective interpretation of 
the significance of the estimated risks. 
The discussion concerning the acceptability of risks and the decision making process 
concerning risks is not yet completed. In The Netherlands, especially after 1990, the search for new 
models and tools led to a study in which various types of risks were compared (Health Council of The 
Netherlands in 1996 and 2008). This search also continues to this day. 
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With the introduction of the concept of risk, both in process safety and occupational safety, the 
paradigm shift was complete. Quantification of risk became an important part of nearly all safety 
decision making processes. While methods for quantifying risk are now widely applied and accepted, 
the proper use of risk perception and risk in the political decision process are still being debated.  
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